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Co-existing, contradictory working memory models are ready for progressive 
refinement: Reply to Logie 
 
Commenting on our paper Sensory-motor integration and brain lesions: Progress 
toward explaining domain-specific phenomena within domain-general working memory 
(Morey, Rhodes, & Cowan, 2019), Logie (2019) endorses a utilitarian view of science, re-
iterates arguments for the multiple-component framework with minimal consideration of its 
plausible competitor (sensory-motor integration, Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2019), and 
implies throughout that our endeavor to compare the respective merits of the multiple-
component and sensory-motor explanations for selective impairment on aural-verbal serial 
recall tasks was an exercise in motivated reasoning, not an earnest attempt to fully consider 
this evidence and allow it to refine our views. We first respond to Logie’s critique of our use 
of recognition data available from some patients, then consider the merits of striving to refine 
models and the evident worth of adversarial discussion.    
 Logie is quick to dismiss our discussion of data from whole-sequence recognition 
tasks (p. 167), but in some respects he is mistaken. First, he claims that considering 
recognition evidence from Basso, Spinnler, Vallar, and Zanobio (1982) and Warrington, 
Logue, and Pratt (1971) would have changed our interpretation. Logie appears to be referring 
to the “recognition of letter strings” task from Basso et al., which is not clearly comparable to 
the whole-sequence recognition data we considered. First, it is unclear how many response 
options there were (some text is consistent with two, other text implies variation); knowing 
this is essential for modelling guessing. Second, the text implies that more than one item 
changed in the “change” options (i.e., “a number of odd letters”, “four odd letters”). Finally, 
Table 3 (p. 267) indicates that participants responded by pointing to an option – it is unclear 
how this worked in the aural condition, which is the one we would have considered. For these 
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reasons, we do not know that these data are comparable with the other examples. In 
Warrington et al., numbers correct are given for only strings of 4 items (p. 383) for JB and 
WH in addition to KF (who we already included). We might have considered these two 
additional data points. Logie suggests that doing so would change our story, because “none of 
those patients showed better recognition than recall” (p. 167).  However, comparing 
recognition and recall data (see Table 4, p. 383, letters with four items per string), KF 
achieves 72.5% correct on the recognition-based sequence matching task and 10% correct on 
the recall task, JB achieves 90% correct via recognition and 10% via recall, and WH achieves 
75% correct via recognition and 3% correct via recall. These data from JB and WH show the 
same pattern as the more comprehensive data from comparable patients that we analyzed, and 
are therefore perfectly consistent with our argument that these patients might have 
remembered more than their recall scores suggested. Finally, Logie argues that our 
presentation of the recognition with the recall data in Figure 1 was misleading because in the 
recognition tasks, participants might have performed better due to guessing. This is why we 
also included estimates of the same patients’ capacity (k). The methods we used to estimate 
capacity include assumptions about guessing appropriate to each kind of task. 
 Where does this leave us in evaluating these sequence-matching data? We ultimately 
did not argue that these data falsify the multiple-component account of these patients’ 
performance. These sequence-matching tasks do not impose identical demands as serial recall 
tasks – for instance, they might be accomplished with item memory alone, given that the foils 
include new words. Moreover, they do not require response production. Nonetheless, they 
arguably require brief memory, as comparable tasks used to investigate visual short-term 
memory do. We raised this point in our original paper (Morey et al., 2019), suggesting that 
these matching tasks could be interpreted differently than originally intended, and we argued 
that they merited further consideration. Other techniques have been applied to measuring 
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memory without overt recall in these cases, such as part-reporting (Warrington & Shallice, 
1969) and missing scan (Shallice & Warrington, 1970), with varying outcomes: judging 
memory from either of these tasks indeed suggests a deficit. We suspect that 
comprehensively analyzing the perceptual, cognitive, and motor requirements of each task 
(which are not necessarily identical) would reveal useful detail about which processes may 
lead to errors. This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that the deficits observed in these 
patients are not attributable to storage per se. 
Logie argues that knowledge accumulation is best served by seeking utility, 
contending that the multiple-component approach has been useful to patients with selective 
deficits, and further questions the worth of “attempting to test whether one theory is correct 
and others are not” (p. 164). While we agree accumulating knowledge should prove 
beneficial, this should occur because we are articulating an accurate and increasingly precise 
description of how the mind works, which naturally entails excluding alternatives. A precise 
description of temporary maintenance must eventually prove useful in unimagined ways. 
There are indeed multiple models of working memory (see Cowan, 2017) and multiple 
interpretations of neuropsychological cases of aural-verbal immediate recall deficits (e.g., 
Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2019; Caplan, Waters, & Howard, 2012; Shallice & Papagno, 
2019). Some models of working memory make assumptions contradictory with those of other 
models. These tentatively co-exist while evidence accumulates, but this does not imply that 
both interpretations are correct. As evidence accumulates, models that propose broad, vague 
outlines are gradually replaced by models with increased specificity. Sometimes initial ideas 
will be tweaked slightly, and sometimes they will be abandoned. An increasingly specific 
theoretical description will grow more useful to anyone aiming to apply the theory to a 
practical problem; for instance, it will better identify boundary conditions missed by the 
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broad-strokes view. The field of working memory is reaching a point of maturity that affords 
this theoretical refinement (Oberauer et al., 2018).  
Although the sensory-motor integration account (e.g., Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 
2019) is disputed (Shallice & Papagno, 2019), we are not convinced that it has been ruled 
out. Both proponents and critics concur that aural-verbal short-term memory deficits often 
co-occur with disruption of speech perception, production, or both. Shallice and Papagno 
argue that the preponderance of evidence is most consistent with the possibility that patients 
experience deficits to a phonological input buffer, a phonological output buffer, or both. If 
recent memory is a consequence of sensory-motor integration, rather than a distinct system, 
then pure cases of recent memory impairment without attendant speech perception or 
production difficulties are indeed difficult to explain. Buchsbaum and D’Esposito surmise 
that the individuals presenting with pure storage impairments possessed an unusual facility to 
recover their related speech functions, though in a way that does not support normal memory. 
Supporting this contention, lesions encompass widespread regions that typically subserve 
non-memory functions even in these patients, consistent with the assumption that initial 
language deficits recovered with some functional reorganization. The inability to identify a 
discrete region exclusively sustaining phonological short-term storage clearly presents a 
difficulty for the buffer perspective (see Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008). New evidence will 
surely bolster one of these accounts, but we maintain that sensory-motor integration remains 
plausible, and must therefore be considered in developing working memory theory. 
In arguing that we must retain specialized short-term stores in part because they 
provide a convenient explanation for patients, Logie conflates evidence and interpretation. 
We consider the main evidential pattern shown by these patients – that recall of aurally-
presented verbal information is poorer than recall of visually-presented verbal information – 
quite robust. It appears in multiple reports, and as Logie points out, is observed in other 
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individuals whose cases are not described in much detail in the published literature. We never 
suggested that these data were likely unreplicable, nor that they could be explained by 
assuming that these patients experienced “a general deficit in their focus of attention. . .” (p. 
164). However, the consistent evidence of deficient recall of aurally- but not visually-
presented verbal sequences should not be conflated with interpretations of what that means. 
The presence of this pattern does not demand that one assumes damage to a phonological 
store. The pattern affords multiple interpretations, whose merits must be weighed. In his 
comment, Logie hardly acknowledges the sensory-motor integration view (e.g., Buchsbaum 
et al., 2011; Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2008; Buchsbaum & D’Esposito, 2019; Caplan et al., 
2012). The sensory-motor integration view of these cases offers an alternative explanation for 
why recall of aural information specifically might be disrupted. This alternative differs from 
the multiple-component account in that it does not require positing a phonological short-term 
store. It does not dispute that a distinctive pattern of results was observed, but shifts the 
potential source of the problem to communication between aural and motor systems. This 
should not be derided as “using different labels to refer to what are essentially the same 
concepts” (p. 162): such a shift in theory leads to different predictions regarding other, related 
phenomena, even if it does not mean that advice to patients about coping should change at 
present. Shifting the source of the deficit to communication between perceptual and motor 
systems highlights a perennial weakness of the multiple component framework, namely that 
the way in which the components interact with each other and with related systems remains 
under-specified. This is a key area in which the multiple component account needs 
refinement, and might be improved by serious consideration of the sensory-motor integration 
account.  
Going forward, collaboration between proponents of different theoretical positions 
(such as the one two of us, NC and SR, are currently engaged in with Logie) might prove 
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helpful. It provides a clear forum to compare ideas and ensures that competing interpretations 
cannot be ignored. For example, Rhodes et al. (2019) tested for and found an indication of 
competition between storage and processing in the form of a trade-off between two tasks with 
shifting emphasis (consistent with some degree of domain generality). As Logie notes, the 
data from this and a related study (Doherty et al., 2019) did not fully match anyone’s 
predictions. In effect, these data falsified particular versions of each model, bringing future 
iterations closer. Given the important practical implications of understanding the nature of 
these neuropsychological cases, future research investigating the neuropsychology of 
working memory would benefit from similar collaborative approaches.  
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